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Crisis in the American Courts: Gre lord and the Destruction
of Fiduciar Bonds Between the Justice S stem and Societ
While it is commonly accepted and agreed upon that
judges ought not to be partial, which (for reasons which
will be discussed later) in the case of the judge
necessarily implies corrupt, very seldom is there a reason
given as to why the judge ought not to be partial to one
litigant or the other. Perhaps this is because the
judiciary is considered, as it was by the Founding Fathers,
to be the weakest branch of the government and therefore the
least able to do harm, or perhaps it is because the answer
to this question is considered to be too obvious and
therefore uninteresting. Nevertheless, with the
ever-expanding role of the judicial system into the
policy-making role that was traditionally reserved solely
for the legislature (such as can be seen in the recent cases
involving affirmative action, busing, and abortion, just to
name a few), it is time to re-examine the role of the judge
in the judicial system and his position in, responsibility
to, and relationship with the rest of society.
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Throughout history, the impartiality whi~h a judge must
posess has been a topi~ whi~h has enjoyed mu~h dis~ussion
and review. For example, one ~an find passages in the Bible
des~ribing God Himself as a just and impartial judge who
does not dis~riminate or take an offering when he judges.
In Deuteronomy, Moses tells those men he appoints as judges
that they should "have no fear of men; for judgment is
God's." (Dt. 1:17) The a~t or profession of judging has
itself ~ome to be regarded as almost a divine undertaking.
"A~ting as God or as God's Deputy, the judge is under an
obligation...to imitate GOd."l
One of the reasons for the Ameri~an Revolution (as
expressed in the De~laration of Independen~e) was that the
.
~olonists believed the King's judges to be beholden to the
~rown, rather than to justi~e. A~~ordingly, when the
Founding Fathers were writing the federal and various state
~onstitutions, great ~are was taken to provide assuran~es
.
that the judi~iary would not be politi~ally responsible to
any authority higher than that of the people themselves.
Guidelines for impartiality were even written into judge's
oaths of offi~e (su~h as this oath of offi~e written in 1777
for the Chan~ellor of Virginia) whereby they would swear to:
do equal right to all manner of people, great and
small, high and low, ri~h and poor, a~~ording to
equity and good ~ons~ien~e and the laws and usages
of Virginia, without respe~t of persons. You
shall take not by yourself, or by any other, any
gift, fee, or reward, of gold, silver, or any
other thing, dire~tly or indire~tly of any person,
great or small, for any matter done or to be done
by virtue of your offi~e, ex~ept su~h fee or
salary as shall be by law appointed...you
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shall...do equal and impartial justice
fraud, f~vour, affection or partiality.
you God.
In a 1780 document entitled, "A Declaration of the
without
So help
Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts," (a document similar in intent to that of the
Bill of Rights of the U.S Constitution) it was asserted that
(It is) essential to the preservation of the
rights of every individual, his life, liberty,
property, and character, that there be an
impartial interpretation of the laws, and
administration of justice. It is the right of
every citizen to be tried by judges as free,
impartial and independent as the lot of humanity
will admit.
The document went on to specify the means by which this
result might be obtained, but what is particularly
interesting is that the authors of this declaration seem to
. have had full cognition of the fact that judges, unlike the
God whom they are supposed to imitate, are imperfect and
fallible.
The Founders recognized the danger of placing so
tremendous an authority in one person in the executive
branch, so they constructed a multitude of checks and
balances on the power of that position so as to render it
unlikely that power become there concentrated and
consequently corrupted. Sufficient reason for the founders
to relax their suspicions of corruptibility somewhat when
they were designing the legislative branch was afforded by
Aristotle who in Book Three of The Politics, pointed out





(...to be said for the many.) Each of them by
himself may not be of good quality, but when they
all come together it is possible that they
surpass--collectively and as a body, altho~gh not
individually--the quality of the few best.
Should even a few individual members of congress fall
prey to the cabals of a faction, the integrity of the body
would, as a whole, remain intact. With respect to the
judiciary, however, little consideration was given to the
.
development of methods and practices whereby judges could be
effectively checked. In "The Federalist Papers," Alexander
Hamilton took the position that those who had enough
knowledge of the laws to be judges were few, "and making the
proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human
nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite
the requsite integrity with the requisite knowledge.,,4
Citing the scarcity of persons qualified to be judges, and
the need that these persons be therefore kept in office,
Hamilton proposed that judges receive life tenure once
appointed to their positions rather than serve for a fixed
length of time. He also argued that tenure would free
judges from deciding cases based on political pressures such
as those which would be apparent if judges were constantly
subject to popular vote and approval. Again, as a
indication that the Founders recognised that corruption
could obtain in the judiciary, Hamilton also cited the jury
system as an effective check upon the judge, stating that:
"(the jury system) must.. .be an effective check against
.
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corruption. It greatly multiplies the impediments to its
. success.
,,5
What was perhaps unforseen by the Founders was the
amount of publicity and constant public scrutiny which would
be received by the President, and how this publicity would
serve as a great and powerful check on the power of that
position--the kind of publicity which, by their very nature,
the courts cannot (and are unable to) admit.
The Problem
The judge is in a very interesting position. He has
almost no limit on his authority within his jurisdiction,
only mild sanctions imposed upon him for being in error
. (this sanction, if we wish to call it that, being an
overturn of his decision upon appeal), and the very nature
of his office requires that his deliberations and decisions
be made in near complete secrecy and privacy. From the
standpoint of the Legal Realist, the judge is free to decide
cases based upon his own opinions of what constitutes
justice so long as he can justify his decision with previous
decisions in similar cases or demonstrate that there are
overriding principles involved which necessitate that his
decision be made in one way or another. The only boundary
which the judge is asked to observe is that of consistency
with the decisions of higher courts and (to a lesser extent)
.
with his own precident. On this view it becomes very easy
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to both account for judicial corruption and show why it is
so particularly noxious a crime:
Judges who accept bribes are simply rejecting their
obligations to follow past and set future precidence in
favor of personal profit. While they realize that they
are--to a certain extent--bound to follow precidence unless
there is a mitigating factor in the present case, they
ignore this responsibility and substitute in its place their
own personal profit as the motive for and the basis on which
they decide the case. In the sentencing hearing of former
(Greylord) Judge John Devine, the presiding U.S. District
.
Court Judge Susan Getzendanner said, "What makes judicial
corruption...an unthinkable...(and) stunning crime...(is)
that it harms the public, it harms me, and (it harms) my
fellow jUdges.,,6 Obviously, the short-term effect of
judicial corruption is the immediate loss of justice and
fairness to the immediate parties in the molested trial
proceedings. What is worse, however, is that the verdict
rendered in the contaminated case can become accepted and
later cited as legal precedent, thereby tainting the whole
of the body of law.
Judges are often thought of as professionals in a
community in much the same way as are physicians, lawyers,
and dentists. There is a significant difference, however,
between the judge and the man who holds any other
professional position, the scope of which far exceeds merely
. the fact that they are practitioners of separate fields.
While it may be true to a certain extent that the judge
himself is but mere flesh, as are both the defendant and the
plaintiff, and that regardless of the outcome of the case
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This difference can be found in the type of relationship
~ enjoyed by the judge and by the professional--and especially
in each of their respective responsibilities--to the
community itself.
All of the above-mentioned professionals have a specific
relationship with the person or persons to whom they have
been asked to render their services. In the case of the
physician or dentist, this relationship is with the patient
and in that of the lawyer, the client or clients. In the
case of the judge, however, this particular relationship
assumes a special significance because it involves, as
recipients of the judge's services, all of the members of
the community simultaneously.
In the prosecution's closing argument at the sentencing
~
hearing of former (Greylord) Associate Judge John Murphy,
U.S. District Attorney and Chief Prosecutor Daniel Webb
said:
...we place in a judge
confidence of the entire
single, most honored and
public of~ice that we ever
citizens.
the entire trust and
community. It is the
respected and trusted
bestow upon one of our
This type and magnitude of broad-based authority and
influence vested in the single individual, the judge, can
not be found anywhere else in the professional world, yet in
this case it is very seldom questioned.
~
world of mere physicality. Hegel, perhaps better than any
other political philosopher, was able to describe this
special kind of relationship between the state and the
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the Earth will continue to spin on its axis, the Sun will
continue to rise, and waves will still pound the rocky
shores, what is either forgotten or unrealized is that there
is in the bench a magnitude of meaning which trancends this
individual. In The Philosophy of Right, he says:
In contrast with the spheres of individual rights
and individual welfare, the state is from one
point of view an external necessity and their
higher authority; its nature is such that their
laws and interests are subordinate to it and
dependent on it. On the other hand, however, it
is the end immanent within them, and its strength
lies in the unity of its own universal end and aim
with the particular interest of individuals, in
the fact that individuals have duties to the state
in (the same) porportion as they have rights
against it..
* *
(The nature of community) is twofold: (i) at one
extreme, explicit individuality of consciousness
and will, and (ii) at the other extreme,
universality which knows and wills what is
substantive. Hence they attain their right in
both these respects only in so far as both their
private personality and its substantive basis are
actualized. Now in the family and in civil
society they acquire their right in the first of
these respects directly and in the second
indirectly, in that (i) they find their
substantive self-consciousness in social
institutions which are the universal implicit in
their particular interests, and (ii) the
Corporation supplies them with an occupation and
an activity directed on the universal end.
.
These institutions are the components of the
constitution in the sphere of particularity. They
are, therefore, the firm foundation not only of
the state but also of the citizen's trust in it
and sentiment towards it. They are the pillars of
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public freedom since in them particular freedom is
realized and rational...
...Only in this way
universality (community)
own object and end...
is the substantive
aware of itself as its
* *
...the substance of the individual...is his
political sentiment (or patriotism)...which pure
and simple, is assured conviction with truth as
its basis..This sentiment is, in general, trust,
or the consciousness that my interest, both
substantive and particular, is contained in (the
state's) interest and end, i.e.gin the (state's)
relation to me as an individual.
Judicial corruption cannot help but to destroy this
political sentiment brought about by trust, and without this
feeling of patriotism, this demonstration of individual
personal support, the legal system cannot help help but to
.
disintegrate.
Concrete social wholes condition and make possible
the integrity of the individual to be for himself
and to take care of his own affairs; concurrently,
the whole is the common product of all individual
inner activties through which alone it comes
about. The independence of individuals and their
dependence on a common social work are produced
together and are producing each other: The
welfare of the whole means the welfare of its
members and the converse. To know this and to be
loyal to it is the mutual trust which is the
substancial core of social ethics. It implies
that freedom10for all and freedom for each are
inseparable.
.
In the courtroom, the law assumes a dual role. It not
only has the general quality of rules which apply to entire
groups of persons as it is originally formulated by the
legislature, but it becomes applicable to specific persons
dealt with as individuals who are bringing or receiving
particular complaints. It is this transcendent function of
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the law in the particular context of the courtroom which is
responsible for elevating the actions of the judge and
litigants to this higher magnitude of meaning.
John Noonan suggests that one of the reasons that
bribery is and will continue to be morally condemned is that
it is a violation of trust, the precious necessity of every
social enterprise. Trust is the expectation that one will
do what one is relied upon to do. Public officials are
relied upon to act for the public interest and not their own
enrichment. But when judges accept bribes:
.
...they divide their loyalty. Whether or not they
consciously act against the public interest, they
have adopted a second criterion of action, the
proper reciprocation of the bribe. The resultant
conflict of interest is always a11dilution of
loyalty, always a betrayal of trust.
There are a number of ways in which a judge may be
corrupt, all of which stem from some kind of abuse or
another. This may be in the abuse of his position in the
society, abuse of the trust societal members have placed in
him, abuse of the judici~l system itself, or abuse of the
very laws which he has sworn to uphold.
One might well ask how it is possible to abuse 'trust'
or 'laws' since these are not things which are commonly
considered to be abusable. The explanation for this
unorthodox usage is simple. To abuse something is to use it
for some purpose other than for what it was intended, and by
doing so, detract from its value or quality. One abuses
.
another's trust by using it as a cloak for performing
unethical (and perhaps illegal) deeds--unsuspected and
page 11
.
therefore unnoticed. Laws are abused when they are
construed in such a way as to subvert the intentions of the
framers of that law, and are instead used to benefit someone
who is not otherwise deserving of benefit, or to bring some
kind of harm to someone who is otherwise not deserving of
that harm. The corrupt judge is in the perfect position to
effect these types of abuses. In Book One of Plato's
Republic, Socrates argues that if a man is to be considered
a good guardian of something, he must also know how that
thing with which he has been charged might be stolen in
order that he may protect it from each possible threat.
This leads to the seeming contradiction that, as Socrates
points out, if the just man is an expert in guarding (in
.
this case) money, he must also be an expert in stealing it.
Socrates' interlocutors regard this as counterintuitive and
reject it as being difinitive of justice in a man, but the
implication for the judge seems obvious. The man who
becomes knowledgeable about the workings of the legal system
is the one who is also most able to abuse it. This is what
is so particularly lamentable about the Greylord cases. The
.
judges involved in the various instances of conspiracy and
bribery exposed by the investigation occupied the most
powerful positions in the legal system, had the full trust
of their communities, and not only had the responsibility
for justice within those communities, but also for those
respective communities' idea of justice itself. The idea
that one might attain an expert status in the abuse of the
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legal system twists and distorts the commonsense notion of
justice.
Judges are essentially human persons with human
imperfections and weaknesses, yet are charged with handling
super-human responsibilities. A great majority of persons
who assume the bench are aware of this, and try to the best
of their ability to do their job, which is to promote and
secure justice for those persons who enter their courtrooms.
Unfortunately, however, from the convictions of the
so-called "Greylord Judges" that have been secured by the
FBI and the United States Attorney Office, it seems that
there are some judges who preside over courtrooms to obtain
financial and/or political gains for themselves rather than
.
in order to promote the well-being of their society. At the
time that the first indictments in the "Grey lord" case were
announced, one could hear comments such as: "Just write
this off as another episode of Chicago-style politics," or
"So what? Many professions have persons among their ranks
who are either dishonest or incompetent. This is an
unfortunate and undesirable fact, but a fact nonetheless,
and it is just a 'part of the way that the world works'.
There is nothing that can be done about it."
It is my contention that in civil society, judicial
corruption is a greater tragedy than is corruption or
incompetence in any other professional field. For example,
if a patient were to believe his physician or dentist to be
. incompetent, or merely question the particular
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professional's diagnosis of a specific case, he has the
option of going to see another practitioner for a second
opinion (or third, or fourth, if he so desires). Likewise,
if a client questions the competency--or the honesty--of his
attorney, he can fire him and request the services of any of
a multitude of available counsel. This freedom of choice,
however, does not obtain in the peculiar case of the judge.
The reason for this disparity is that the judge does not
work for the person or persons who are immediately before
him, but works instead for the entire community. His
responsibility is to the whole community, but he fulfills
this responsibility through the proper disposition of the
individuals--and the cases they bring--before him. The
.
defendant or plaintiff who believes that the judge to which
his case has been assigned is incompetent, or is for some
other reason unfit to hear his case, is left with almost no
means of action in which he may take recourse. In most
cases the defendant is left with only two choices. He must
either appeal to his assigned judge for a replacement (which
is, of course, subject to rejection, and if not accepted
will most probably cause damage to his case), or he must
risk a tainted verdict upon the first hearing of the case,
and hope that he later be granted an appeal, or perhaps even
a re-hearing. These options unfortunately do not seem to be
adequate courses of action when one considers that the
.
matter at hand is the procurement of justice.
authority to do this act which he is able to do only because
of the powers vested in his official position. By the very
nature of his act, it is something which cannot be made
Public trust, a thorough knowledge of the law, and a
respected position are the tools which the "good" judge
needs in order that he may carry out his assigned duties.
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Let's imagine a scenario in which a judge has a magical
device which can look into the future and tell the judge
which litigant in the case presently before him will win.
Assuming that there is no aspect of what is called a
self-fulfilling prophesy involved, what harm would there be
if the judge were to accept bribes voluntarily offered by
the fatalistically pre-disposed winner? The judge has taken
nothing from the loser (not even, strictly speaking, a fair
trial), and nothing unwittingly from the winner. Let's also
immagine that our judge gives all of the money that he has
been offered and has accepted in this way to various needy
charities. Can we still say that justice is somehow being
violated? Yes, because the judge is doing something which
.
he is not officially empowered to do. He does not have the
consent of the people, and therefore lacks the requisite
public. It is a betrayal of public trust. In the case of
this bribe, as with any bribe, there is no accountability
but to the briber and in the person who is bribed.
.
Unfortunately however, they are also the devices by which
the corrupt judge takes advantage of society and destroys
the philosophical underpinnings of the system of justice,
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the preservation and maintenance of that with which he has
Are There Any Solutions?
"How do you attack judicial corruption and
misconduct? Who should investigate and punish the
judges? What should they look for? How should
they do it? ...These issues have been debated for
years among lawyers and judges in forums ranging
from raucous saloon discussions to formal and
sometimes pompous debate within the American Bar
Association. But Grer.l~rd has brought them intothe public spotlight.
'
The Greylord investigations and subsequent trials have
been an effective check on the Cook county court system for
the time being, but it will most likely have little effect
as time goes on, and has not done anything to control
~
judicial corruption outside its immediate scope. What is
needed is to establish a check from within the judicial
system itself. Rather than the threat of external
investigations imposed upon the judiciary (which, handled
improperly could become a means by which good judges could
be hassled by a corrupted or factious justice department),
an internal check should be developed. One such method,
which by no means exhausts the possibilities by which an
internal check might be established, would be to offer a
third alternative to what now is either a trial by jury or a
bench trial. This third alternative, which could be
selected by either party to a case, would be to have the
case heard by a three-member hearing board or tribunal
~ consisting of periodically rotating judges. Were one judge
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approached and bribed, the outcome of the case by no means
would be decided. What is more, the likelihood of anyone
judge accepting a bribe would be greatly diminished for fear
of being discovered by two other judges with whom he has had
neither sufficient time nor opportunity to form a
conspiracy. While it would become necessary to hire more
judges, no single judge would have complete responsibility
for the decision in any given case, so conflict of interest
would not be as crucial an issue. The current restriction
which prohibits judges from practicing law could be relaxed,
so the amount of pay given to the auxilliary judges could be
considerably reduced. Under this system, the check upon the
judge usually afforded by the jury could be effectively
.
reproduced without the costs involved in the jury selection
procedure, or any of the other problems associated with the
jury system.
Hegel said:
This uncertainty of who is right and the legal
claims and defences of each party against the
other in civil law suits could not take place if
the objectivity of the right in and for itself
were not presupposed. The ~ must represent
this objectivity of right. ~fs requires his
independence from practisal interests, if he is to
judge them impartially.
Justice is represented to us as a lady blindfolded,
holding a set of scales. In order for justice to obtain, it
is necessary that she apply legal rules blindly. In order
to preserve our legal system, it is necessary to protect
.
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